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fortress Zeelandia, near present-day
Tainan. Koxinga succeeded in taking
the fortress and driving the remaining Dutch back to Batavia (currently
Jakarta) over the course of a bitterly contested nine-month siege.
Andrade compares Chinese seventeenthcentury military capabilities with those
of the Dutch, especially on four levels.
His conclusions are, first, that the
technology in guns was about equal but
that second, the military discipline of
the Chinese was better than that of the
Dutch, whose discipline was vaunted
in Europe at the time. Third, as for
ships, the ability of the Dutch ships to
sail to windward gave them an edge
over Chinese. Fourth, although the
Chinese outnumbered the Dutch by a
large margin, the Renaissance fortress
configuration, with corner battlements, allowed the Dutch to hold out
for many months before surrendering.
That was long enough for Koxinga to
study and absorb the technology of
the Renaissance fort and incorporate it
into his own counterstrategy. Each side
had elements of relative strength, and
the elements were not static in terms
of relative advantage. Thus, Andrade
proposes, during the seventeenth
century China was fairly similar to
Europe in terms of military capabilities.
Koxinga and his heirs controlled Taiwan
until 1683, when they were defeated by
a former Zheng family commander, Shi
Lang, who had defected to support the
Qing emperor. Andrade makes the interesting observation that the Qing dynasty, following the Taiwan campaigns
of the late 1600s, was an era of 160
years of peace in China, requiring little
in the way of military advancement.
Meanwhile, Europe was embroiled in
nearly constant warfare, improving its
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military capabilities decade by decade. Thus the Chinese were to be at
a distinct military disadvantage when
the Opium Wars began in 1839, and
the century of humiliation for China
was by that time a fait accompli with
respect to relative military advantage.
The book includes a fine set of maps
and figures, as well as a dust jacket
with an evocative seventeenth-century
painting by Andries Beckman of the
Dutch fort at Batavia. The Dutch
governor of Taiwan, Frederick Coyet,
was executed symbolically in front
of this fort for losing the profitable colony of Taiwan to Koxinga.
grant f. rhode
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Lo Jung-pang, edited by Bruce Elleman. China as
a Sea Power: A Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese
People during the Southern Song and Yuan Periods. Singapore: National Univ. of Singapore Press,
2012. 378pp. $35

Lo Jung-pang (1912–81), the scion of
a distinguished Chinese family, was
a great historian, old enough to have
received a traditional Chinese education when young and young enough
to have mastered the Western way as
a student abroad. Like many of his
cohorts, he chose exile, becoming one
of those who for decades kept the study
of China alive outside the country until
the post-Mao liberalization of the 1980s
allowed its resumption at home. Lo,
a long-serving professor and historian in the United States, focused on
China’s great middle era and launched
the field of China’s maritime history.
Bruce Elleman’s unearthing and editing
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of this previously unavailable 1950s
manuscript, properly seeing contemporary United States–China strategic
relations as his backdrop, has made
Lo’s encyclopedic knowledge available
to us. However, Lo’s book is instructive beyond that; China as a Sea Power
is a magisterial contribution to the
study of world maritime history and
should be known everywhere by those
who are interested in that subject.
Lo was determined to illuminate China’s
maritime history to edify his countrymen, who had seen the consequences
of a lack of naval power. In the first
decades of Lo’s life, foreign navies dominated China’s coastal ports and also
had wide-ranging rights in other ports
hundreds of miles up the great rivers. It
was as if foreign navies could, by right,
sail at will up the Mississippi from New
Orleans to Minneapolis. The Chinese
had become accustomed to the seeming
inevitability of such circumstances and
knew of the failures to revive Chinese
naval power at the end of the nineteenth
century and of Japan’s easy closure of
China’s ports between 1937 and 1945. It
was for them that Lo wanted to present
a grand history of Chinese power on
the sea, and not only naval power but
seaborne commercial power and the
urbanization, wealth, and sophistication
that it had created in great ages past.
China’s remarkable efflorescence that
we see today derives from such visions.
Of this book’s many compelling accounts, perhaps the richest is Lo’s
description of the naval campaigns of
the Mongols, who, as the Yuan dynasty,
ruled China between 1271 and 1368.
The Mongols, who had no experience fighting at sea, quickly adapted
and soon organized armadas built and
manned by their new Chinese subjects.
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They launched invasions northward
into the East China Sea and southward
into the South China Sea. Today’s
increasingly visible and vocal Chinese
admirals seem eager to draw inspiration from these huge undertakings, but
for all the immense capabilities they
demonstrated, Kublai Khan’s two invasions of Japan and his three invasions
of Vietnam in the thirteenth century
all ended in disaster. Eight centuries
later, in his November 2012 valedictory
address, Hu Jintao, China’s outgoing
president and the Communist Party’s
general secretary, urged his successors
“to build China into a maritime power.”
In this they would be well advised to
read Lo Jung-pang’s account of China’s
past glories as a sea power, not only as
inspiration but also as a cautionary tale.
charles horner
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Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. The China Threat:
Memories, Myths, and Realities in the 1950s. New
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2012. 312pp. $39.50

President Dwight D. Eisenhower is
remembered in history as a dedicated
Cold Warrior whose staunch anticommunism included commitment to the
containment and rollback of communism in Asia. In The China Threat
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker challenges
this narrative, suggesting that Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles possessed a more nuanced view
of China than is generally supposed.
Tucker is an established and respected
historian of U.S. policy toward China
whose earlier works include a study
of U.S.-Chinese relations during the
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